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Language and axioms

The language of PRA consists of:

• A countably infinite number of variables x, y, z,....
• The propositional connectives;
• The equality symbol =, the constant symbol 0, and the successor symbol S (meaning add one);
• A symbol for each primitive recursive function.

The logical axioms of PRA are the:

• Tautologies of the propositional calculus;
• Usual axiomatization of equality as an equivalence relation.

The logical rules of PRA are modus ponens and variable substitution. The non-logical axioms are, firstly:

• S ( x ) ≠ 0 {\displaystyle S(x)\neq 0} ;
• S ( x ) = S ( y ) → x = y , {\displaystyle S(x)=S(y)\to x=y,}

where x ≠ y {\displaystyle x\neq y} always denotes the negation of x = y {\displaystyle x=y} so that, for example, S ( 0 ) = 0 {\displaystyle S(0)=0} is a negated proposition.

Further, recursive defining equations for every primitive recursive function may be adopted as axioms as desired. For instance, the most common characterization of the primitive recursive functions is as the 0 constant and successor function closed under projection, composition and primitive recursion. So for a (n+1)-place function f defined by primitive recursion over a n-place base function g and (n+2)-place iteration function h there would be the defining equations:

• f ( 0 , y 1 , … , y n ) = g ( y 1 , … , y n ) {\displaystyle f(0,y_{1},\ldots ,y_{n})=g(y_{1},\ldots ,y_{n})}
• f ( S ( x ) , y 1 , … , y n ) = h ( x , f ( x , y 1 , … , y n ) , y 1 , … , y n ) {\displaystyle f(S(x),y_{1},\ldots ,y_{n})=h(x,f(x,y_{1},\ldots ,y_{n}),y_{1},\ldots ,y_{n})}

Especially:

• x + 0 = x   {\displaystyle x+0=x\ }
• x + S ( y ) = S ( x + y )   {\displaystyle x+S(y)=S(x+y)\ }
• x ⋅ 0 = 0   {\displaystyle x\cdot 0=0\ }
• x ⋅ S ( y ) = x ⋅ y + x   {\displaystyle x\cdot S(y)=x\cdot y+x\ }
• ... and so on.

PRA replaces the axiom schema of induction for first-order arithmetic with the rule of (quantifier-free) induction:

• From φ ( 0 ) {\displaystyle \varphi (0)} and φ ( x ) → φ ( S ( x ) ) {\displaystyle \varphi (x)\to \varphi (S(x))} , deduce φ ( y ) {\displaystyle \varphi (y)} , for any predicate φ . {\displaystyle \varphi .}

In first-order arithmetic, the only primitive recursive functions that need to be explicitly axiomatized are addition and multiplication. All other primitive recursive predicates can be defined using these two primitive recursive functions and quantification over all natural numbers. Defining primitive recursive functions in this manner is not possible in PRA, because it lacks quantifiers.

Logic-free calculus

It is possible to formalise PRA in such a way that it has no logical connectives at all—a sentence of PRA is just an equation between two terms. In this setting a term is a primitive recursive function of zero or more variables. Curry (1941) gave the first such system. The rule of induction in Curry's system was unusual. A later refinement was given by Goodstein (1954). The rule of induction in Goodstein's system is:

F ( 0 ) = G ( 0 ) F ( S ( x ) ) = H ( x , F ( x ) ) G ( S ( x ) ) = H ( x , G ( x ) ) F ( x ) = G ( x ) . {\displaystyle {F(0)=G(0)\quad F(S(x))=H(x,F(x))\quad G(S(x))=H(x,G(x)) \over F(x)=G(x)}.}

Here x is a variable, S is the successor operation, and F, G, and H are any primitive recursive functions which may have parameters other than the ones shown. The only other inference rules of Goodstein's system are substitution rules, as follows:

F ( x ) = G ( x ) F ( A ) = G ( A ) A = B F ( A ) = F ( B ) A = B A = C B = C . {\displaystyle {F(x)=G(x) \over F(A)=G(A)}\qquad {A=B \over F(A)=F(B)}\qquad {A=B\quad A=C \over B=C}.}

Here A, B, and C are any terms (primitive recursive functions of zero or more variables). Finally, there are symbols for any primitive recursive functions with corresponding defining equations, as in Skolem's system above.

In this way the propositional calculus can be discarded entirely. Logical operators can be expressed entirely arithmetically, for instance, the absolute value of the difference of two numbers can be defined by primitive recursion:

P ( 0 ) = 0 P ( S ( x ) ) = x x − ˙ 0 = x x − ˙ S ( y ) = P ( x − ˙ y ) | x − y | = ( x − ˙ y ) + ( y − ˙ x ) . {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}P(0)=0\quad &\quad P(S(x))=x\\x{\dot {-}}0=x\quad &\quad x{\mathrel {\dot {-}}}S(y)=P(x{\mathrel {\dot {-}}}y)\\|x-y|=&(x{\mathrel {\dot {-}}}y)+(y{\mathrel {\dot {-}}}x).\\\end{aligned}}}

Thus, the equations x=y and | x − y | = 0 {\displaystyle |x-y|=0} are equivalent. Therefore, the equations | x − y | + | u − v | = 0 {\displaystyle |x-y|+|u-v|=0} and | x − y | ⋅ | u − v | = 0 {\displaystyle |x-y|\cdot |u-v|=0} express the logical conjunction and disjunction, respectively, of the equations x=y and u=v. Negation can be expressed as 1 − ˙ | x − y | = 0 {\displaystyle 1{\dot {-}}|x-y|=0} .

See also

• Elementary recursive arithmetic
• Finite-valued logic
• Heyting arithmetic
• Peano arithmetic
• Primitive recursive function
• Robinson arithmetic
• Second-order arithmetic
• Skolem arithmetic

Notes

• Curry, Haskell B. (1941). "A formalization of recursive arithmetic". American Journal of Mathematics. 63 (2): 263–282. doi:10.2307/2371522. JSTOR 2371522. MR 0004207.

• Goodstein, R. L. (1954). "Logic-free formalisations of recursive arithmetic". Mathematica Scandinavica. 2: 247–261. doi:10.7146/math.scand.a-10412. MR 0087614.

• Kreisel, Georg (1960). "Ordinal logics and the characterization of informal concepts of proof" (PDF). Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians, 1958. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 289–299. MR 0124194. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 May 2017.

• Skolem, Thoralf (1923). "Begründung der elementaren Arithmetik durch die rekurrierende Denkweise ohne Anwendung scheinbarer Veränderlichen mit unendlichem Ausdehnungsbereich" [The foundations of elementary arithmetic established by means of the recursive mode of thought without the use of apparent variables ranging over infinite domains] (PDF). Skrifter Utgit av Videnskapsselskapet I Kristiania. I, Matematisk-naturvidenskabelig Klasse (in German). 6: 1–38.
  • Skolem, Thoralf (1967) [1923]. "The foundations of elementary arithmetic established by means of the recursive mode of thought, without the use of apparent variables ranging over infinite domains". In van Heijenoort, Jean (ed.). From Frege to Gödel. Harvard University Press. pp. 302–333. MR 0209111. (accessible to patrons with print disabilities)
• Tait, William W. (1981). "Finitism". The Journal of Philosophy. 78 (9): 524–546. doi:10.2307/2026089. JSTOR 2026089.

• Tait, William W. (June 2012). "Primitive Recursive Arithmetic and its Role in the Foundations of Arithmetic: Historical and Philosophical Reflections" (PDF). Epistemology versus Ontology. pp. 161–180. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4435-6_8.

• Feferman, Solomon (1998). "What rests on what? The proof-theoretic analysis of mathematics" (PDF). In The Light Of Logic. doi:10.1093/oso/9780195080308.003.0010.

Additional reading

• Rose, H. E. (1961). "On the consistency and undecidability of recursive arithmetic". Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik. 7 (7–10): 124–135. doi:10.1002/malq.19610070707. MR 0140413.

References

1. reprinted in translation in van Heijenoort (1967) - Skolem, Thoralf (1967) [1923]. "The foundations of elementary arithmetic established by means of the recursive mode of thought, without the use of apparent variables ranging over infinite domains". In van Heijenoort, Jean (ed.). From Frege to Gödel. Harvard University Press. pp. 302–333. MR 0209111. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=0209111 ↩

2. Tait 1981. - Tait, William W. (1981). "Finitism". The Journal of Philosophy. 78 (9): 524–546. doi:10.2307/2026089. JSTOR 2026089. https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2026089 ↩

3. Kreisel 1960. - Kreisel, Georg (1960). "Ordinal logics and the characterization of informal concepts of proof" (PDF). Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians, 1958. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 289–299. MR 0124194. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 May 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170510093701/http://www.mathunion.org/ICM/ICM1958/Main/icm1958.0289.0299.ocr.pdf ↩

4. Feferman (1998, p. 4 (of personal website version)); however, Feferman calls this extension "no longer clearly finitary". - Feferman, Solomon (1998). "What rests on what? The proof-theoretic analysis of mathematics" (PDF). In The Light Of Logic. doi:10.1093/oso/9780195080308.003.0010. https://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/whatrests.pdf ↩