A pooling equilibrium in game theory is an equilibrium outcome of a signaling game.
In a signaling game, players send actions called "signals" to other players. These signals are based on privately held information, which is not known to others in the game. These actions do not reveal a player's "type" to other players, who then choose their strategies accordingly. In a pooling equilibrium, all types of a given sender send the same signal. Some senders represent their true type, while others correctly mimic the type of others, having no incentive to differentiate themselves. As a result, the receiver acts as if they have received no information, maximizing their utility according to their prior beliefs.
See also
References
Ellison, Glenn. "Game Theory 14.122: Handout #l Finding PBE in Signaling Games", Microeconomic Theory II. MIT OpenCourseWare. https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/14-122-microeconomic-theory-ii-fall-2002/0c77aa544ed2ea3d26fed6f9e4460551_pbe.pdf ↩
pooling equilibrium. Oxford Reference. Retrieved 6 Feb. 2024. https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100336941#:~:text=An%20equilibrium%20in%20which%20agents,choosing%20the%20same%20insurance%20contract ↩
Bergstrom, Carl T.; Számadó, Szabolcs; Lachmann, Michael (2002-11-29). Johnstone, R. A.; Dall, S. R. X. (eds.). "Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences. 357 (1427): 1595–1606. doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1068. ISSN 0962-8436. PMC 1693066. PMID 12495516. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1693066 ↩
Sobel, Joel (2020), Sotomayor, Marilda; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Castiglione, Filippo (eds.), "Signaling Games", Complex Social and Behavioral Systems : Game Theory and Agent-Based Models, New York, NY: Springer US, pp. 251–268, doi:10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_481, ISBN 978-1-0716-0368-0, retrieved 2024-06-30 978-1-0716-0368-0 ↩