Menu
Home
People
Places
Arts
History
Plants & Animals
Science
Life & Culture
Technology
Reference.org
Lesson of Munich
open-in-new
<h2 id="background">Background</h2> <p>The foreign policy of British Prime Minister <a href="/facts/Neville_Chamberlain/dEbKlcBJ">Neville Chamberlain</a> has become inextricably linked with the events of the Munich Crisis. The policy of appeasement and Chamberlain's delusionary announcement of a <i><a href="/facts/Peace_for_our_time/rtp0bRIB">Peace for our time</a></i> has resonated through the following decades as a parable of diplomatic failure.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:3" href="#fn:3"><sup>3</sup></a>: 276 Together with "<a href="/facts/Battle_of_Waterloo/jmATjc2f">Waterloo</a>" and "<a href="/facts/Treaty_of_Versailles/BsNmjaqV">Versailles</a>", the <a href="/facts/Munich_Agreement/r4o68xnA">Munich Agreement</a> has come to signify a disastrous diplomatic outcome.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:4" href="#fn:4"><sup>4</sup></a>: iv The lessons of Munich have profoundly shaped Western foreign policy ever since. <a href="/facts/US_Presidents/Vh0XFrco">US Presidents</a> have cited those lessons as justifications for war in <a href="/facts/Korean_War/Qo93pNhE">Korea</a>, <a href="/facts/Vietnam_War/W0gfbGTE">Vietnam</a> and <a href="/facts/Iraq_War/dlAgf8at">Iraq</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:5" href="#fn:5"><sup>5</sup></a> </p><p>In the United States and the United Kingdom, the words "Munich" and "appeasement" are frequently invoked when demanding forthright, often military, action to resolve an international crisis and characterising a political opponent who condemns negotiation as weakness.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6"><sup>6</sup></a> After the <a href="/facts/1986_bombing_of_Libya/RDUy95gt">1986 bombing of Libya</a>, US President <a href="/facts/Ronald_Reagan/z6AaKAad">Ronald Reagan</a> argued, "Europeans who remember their history understand better than most that there is no security, no safety, in the appeasement of evil."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:7" href="#fn:7"><sup>7</sup></a> Although appeasement, which is conventionally defined as the act of satisfying grievances by concessions with the aim of avoiding war, was once regarded as an effective and even honourable strategy of foreign policy, the term has since the Munich Conference symbolised cowardice, failure and weakness. <a href="/facts/Winston_Churchill/Wm8LXNzH">Winston Churchill</a> described appeasement as "one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:8" href="#fn:8"><sup>8</sup></a> </p><p>The policies have been the subject of intense debate ever since. Historians' assessments have ranged from condemnation for allowing Germany to grow too strong to believing that Germany was so strong that it might well win a war and so postponement of a showdown was in the best interests of Britain and France. The historian <a href="/facts/Andrew_Roberts_(historian)/3HS0YMce">Andrew Roberts</a> argues in 2019 regarding British historians, "Indeed, it is the generally accepted view in Britain today that they were right at least to have tried".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:9" href="#fn:9"><sup>9</sup></a> </p><p>In the same vein, Robert Williamson noted, "Britons and French were deeply traumatized by the horrors of the First World War, and felt quite correctly that their leaders in 1914 had let themselves be drawn, far too easily, into terrible war. The Munich Agreement made sure that no one would think so again. In 1940, when Londoners had to endure the intensive German bombing, no one could say that Britain did not try to avoid this war.... Indeed, Czechoslovakia was abandoned. But when Britain and France did go to war in 1939, they were still unable to save Poland from being conquered and occupied. Clearly, had they gone to war a year earlier, they would not have been able to save Czechoslovakia, either".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:10" href="#fn:10"><sup>10</sup></a> </p> <h2 id="munich-analogies">Munich analogies</h2> <p>"Munich and appeasement", in the words of scholars <a href="/facts/Fredrik_Logevall/RgNv50wq">Fredrik Logevall</a> and Kenneth Osgood, "have become among the dirtiest words in <a href="/facts/American_politics/huMQkzQD">American politics</a>, synonymous with naivete and weakness, and signifying a craven willingness to barter away the nation's vital interests for empty promises." They claimed that the success of <a href="/facts/US_foreign_policy/LqGcw96t">US foreign policy</a> often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers." The presidents who challenged the "tyranny of Munich" have often achieved policy breakthroughs and those who had cited Munich as a principle of US foreign policy had often led the nation into its "most enduring tragedies."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:11" href="#fn:11"><sup>11</sup></a> </p><p>Many later crises were accompanied by cries of "Munich" from politicians and the media. In 1960, the <a href="/facts/Conservatism_in_the_United_States/ye90yMMJ">conservative</a> US Senator <a href="/facts/Barry_Goldwater/DGhULzfw">Barry Goldwater</a> used "Munich" to describe a domestic political issue by saying that an attempt by the <a href="/facts/Republican_Party_(United_States)/XXM1EVPr">Republican Party</a> to appeal to <a href="/facts/Liberalism_in_the_United_States/nlQnBncX">liberals</a> was "the Munich of the Republican Party."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:12" href="#fn:12"><sup>12</sup></a> In 1962, General <a href="/facts/Curtis_LeMay/CB3oYE9P">Curtis LeMay</a> told US President <a href="/facts/John_F._Kennedy/1cdDaswg">John F. Kennedy</a> that his refusal to bomb <a href="/facts/Cuba/vHjTXLPW">Cuba</a> during the <a href="/facts/Cuban_Missile_Crisis/GmDGYcWA">Cuban Missile Crisis</a> was "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich", a pointed barb given that his father <a href="/facts/Joseph_P._Kennedy_Sr./Xh4XRrBv">Joseph P. Kennedy Sr.</a> had supported appeasement in general in his capacity as Ambassador to Britain.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:13" href="#fn:13"><sup>13</sup></a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:14" href="#fn:14"><sup>14</sup></a> In 1965, US President <a href="/facts/Lyndon_Johnson/PKNthHX1">Lyndon Johnson</a>, in justifying increased military action in <a href="/facts/Vietnam_War/W0gfbGTE">Vietnam</a>, stated, "We learned from Hitler and Munich that success only feeds the appetite for aggression."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:15" href="#fn:15"><sup>15</sup></a> </p><p>The <a href="/facts/West_German/oCydk787">West German</a> policy of staying neutral in the <a href="/facts/Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_conflict/2MYWXMWk">Arab–Israeli conflict</a> after the <a href="/facts/Munich_massacre/1XWfhMNT">Munich massacre</a> and the following hijack of the <a href="/facts/Lufthansa_Flight_615/X1aT9tR0">Lufthansa Flight 615</a> in 1972, rather than taking a pro-<a href="/facts/Israel/dEe3IcaY">Israel</a> position, led to Israeli comparisons with the Munich Agreement of appeasement.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:16" href="#fn:16"><sup>16</sup></a> </p><p>Citing Munich in debates on foreign policy has continued to be common in the 21st century.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:17" href="#fn:17"><sup>17</sup></a> During negotiations for the <a href="/facts/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action/ee9rq1qH">Iran nuclear agreement</a> mediated by <a href="/facts/United_States_Secretary_of_State/AgUe4Dkq">Secretary of State</a> <a href="/facts/John_Kerry/K1HWRIMo">John Kerry</a>, Representative <a href="/facts/John_Culberson/zmyW92Bq">John Culberson</a>, a <a href="/facts/Republican_Party_of_Texas/87mqRTjE">Texas Republican</a> Representative, tweeted the message "Worse than Munich." Kerry had himself invoked Munich in a speech in France advocating military action in <a href="/facts/Syria/7pDXGzq8">Syria</a> by saying, "This is our Munich moment."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:18" href="#fn:18"><sup>18</sup></a> </p><p>More recently, the phrase has been evoked in criticisms of Western passivity to Russia's invasions of <a href="/facts/Russo-Georgian_War/mbQ1VVjM">Georgia</a> and <a href="/facts/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine/kE7cHvoQ">Ukraine</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:19" href="#fn:19"><sup>19</sup></a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:20" href="#fn:20"><sup>20</sup></a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:21" href="#fn:21"><sup>21</sup></a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:22" href="#fn:22"><sup>22</sup></a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:23" href="#fn:23"><sup>23</sup></a> </p> <h2 id="see-also">See also</h2> <ul><li><a href="/facts/Western_betrayal/pzCmCjv3">Western betrayal</a></li></ul> <h2 id="further-reading">Further reading</h2> <ul><li>Levy, Jack S. (1994). "Learning and foreign policy: Sweeping a conceptual minefield". <i>International Organization</i>. 48 (2): 279–312. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0020818300028198">10.1017/S0020818300028198</a>. <a href="/facts/S2CID_(identifier)/ldJsHa2Y">S2CID</a> <a href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:55832373">55832373</a>.</li></ul> <h2 id="references">References</h2> <ol> <li id="fn:1"><p>Ripsman, Norrin M.; Levy, Jack S. (2008). "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s". International Security. 33 (2): 148–181. doi:10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.148. JSTOR 40207135. S2CID 57567749. <a href="/wiki/Norrin_M._Ripsman" target="_blank">/wiki/Norrin_M._Ripsman</a> <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:2"><p>"Munich Agreement". Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved 6 August 2018. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Munich-Agreement" target="_blank">https://www.britannica.com/event/Munich-Agreement</a> <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:3"><p>Lukes, Igor; Goldstein, Erik (1999). The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II. Routledge. <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:4"><p>Lukes, Igor; Goldstein, Erik (1999). The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II. Routledge. <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:5"><p>Ripsman, Norrin M.; Levy, Jack S. (2008). "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s". International Security. 33 (2): 148–181. doi:10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.148. JSTOR 40207135. S2CID 57567749. <a href="/wiki/Norrin_M._Ripsman" target="_blank">/wiki/Norrin_M._Ripsman</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:6"><p>Yuen Foong Khong (1992). Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton UP. pp. 4–7. ISBN 0691025355. <a href="0691025355" target="_blank">0691025355</a> <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:7"><p>Beck, Robert J. (1989). "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered". International Security. 14 (2): 161–191. doi:10.2307/2538858. JSTOR 2538858. S2CID 154668071. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538858" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538858</a> <a href="#fnref:7" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:8"><p>Ripsman, Norrin M.; Levy, Jack S. (2008). "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s". International Security. 33 (2): 148–181. doi:10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.148. JSTOR 40207135. S2CID 57567749. <a href="/wiki/Norrin_M._Ripsman" target="_blank">/wiki/Norrin_M._Ripsman</a> <a href="#fnref:8" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:9"><p>Roberts, Andrew (1 November 2019). "'Appeasement' Review: What Were They Thinking? Britain's establishment coalesced around appeasement and bared its teeth at those who dared to oppose it". Wall Street Journal. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/appeasement-review-what-were-they-thinking-11572619353" target="_blank">https://www.wsj.com/articles/appeasement-review-what-were-they-thinking-11572619353</a> <a href="#fnref:9" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:10"><p>Dr. Robert D. Williamson, lecture in Munich - Fifty Years Later, 1988 International Symposium. <a href="#fnref:10" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:11"><p>Logevall, Fredrik; Osgood, Kenneth (2010). "THE GHOST OF MUNICH: America's Appeasement Complex". World Affairs. 173 (2): 13–26. JSTOR 27870285. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27870285" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/27870285</a> <a href="#fnref:11" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:12"><p>Dallek, Matthew (December 1995). "The Conservative 1960s". The Atlantic. p. 6. Retrieved 5 September 2020. <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/12/the-conservative-1960s/376506/" target="_blank">https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/12/the-conservative-1960s/376506/</a> <a href="#fnref:12" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:13"><p>Dobbs, Michael (2008). One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war (1st ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 9780307269362. OCLC 608213334. <a href="9780307269362" target="_blank">9780307269362</a> <a href="#fnref:13" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:14"><p>Wheatcroft, Geoffrey (3 December 2013). "On the Use and Abuse of Munich". Retrieved 11 January 2018. <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/115803/munich-analogies-are-inaccurate-cliched-and-dangerous" target="_blank">https://newrepublic.com/article/115803/munich-analogies-are-inaccurate-cliched-and-dangerous</a> <a href="#fnref:14" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:15"><p>Logevall, Fredrik; Osgood, Kenneth (2010). "THE GHOST OF MUNICH: America's Appeasement Complex". World Affairs. 173 (2): 13–26. JSTOR 27870285. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27870285" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/27870285</a> <a href="#fnref:15" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:16"><p>"Deutsche Feigheit". Der Spiegel (in German). 11 November 1972. Archived from the original on 19 October 2013. Retrieved 16 July 2013. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131019124318/http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image/show.html?did=42765038&aref=image035%2F0542%2FPPM-SP197204601200122.pdf&thumb=false" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20131019124318/http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image/show.html?did=42765038&aref=image035%2F0542%2FPPM-SP197204601200122.pdf&thumb=false</a> <a href="#fnref:16" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:17"><p>Record, Jeffrey (2002). Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo. <a href="#fnref:17" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:18"><p>"Kerry: 'This is our Munich moment'". BBC News. Retrieved 4 October 2021. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-24004687" target="_blank">https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-24004687</a> <a href="#fnref:18" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:19"><p>https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-and-the-lessons-of-munich/ <a href="https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-and-the-lessons-of-munich/" target="_blank">https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-and-the-lessons-of-munich/</a> <a href="#fnref:19" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:20"><p>https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/war-in-ukraine-and-the-forgotten-lesson-of-munich/ <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/war-in-ukraine-and-the-forgotten-lesson-of-munich/" target="_blank">https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/war-in-ukraine-and-the-forgotten-lesson-of-munich/</a> <a href="#fnref:20" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:21"><p>https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/dispatch-from-munich-lessons-of-appeasement/ <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/dispatch-from-munich-lessons-of-appeasement/" target="_blank">https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/dispatch-from-munich-lessons-of-appeasement/</a> <a href="#fnref:21" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:22"><p>https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/05/19/beware-the-munich-lesson-especially-in-ukraine/ <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/05/19/beware-the-munich-lesson-especially-in-ukraine/" target="_blank">https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/05/19/beware-the-munich-lesson-especially-in-ukraine/</a> <a href="#fnref:22" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:23"><p>https://www.rferl.org/a/The_Lesson_Of_Munich_Is_Unity/1292856.html <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/The_Lesson_Of_Munich_Is_Unity/1292856.html" target="_blank">https://www.rferl.org/a/The_Lesson_Of_Munich_Is_Unity/1292856.html</a> <a href="#fnref:23" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> </ol>